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the Congress, conducting research, analyzing legislation, and 
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The Service makes such research available, without parti- 
san bias, in many forms including studies, reports, compila- 
tions, digests, and background briefings. Upon request, CRS 
assists committees in analyzing legislative proposals and 
issues, and in assessing the possible effects of these proposals 
and their alternatives. The Service's senior specialists and 
subject analysts are also available for personal consultations 
in their respective fields of expertise. 
ABSTRACT 
The War Powers Resolution was passed by Congress to insure a congressional 
voice in decisions to send U.S. armed forces abroad into hostilities or situa- 
tions of imminent hostilities. This report analyzes the provisions of the 
Resolution and a decade of experience with it. 

THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 
Under the Constitution, the war powers are divided between Congress and 
the President. Among other relevant grants, Congress has the power to declare 
war and raise and support the armed forces (Article I, section 8 ) ,  while the 
President is Commander in Chief (Article 11, section 2). It is generally 
agreed that the Commander in Chief role gives the President power to utilize 
the timed forces to repel attacks against the United States, but there has 
long been controversy over whether he has the power to send forces into 
hostile situations abroad without a declaration of war or other congres- 
sional authorization. 
During the Vietnam war, when the United States found itself involved for 
many years in an undeclared and unpopular war, Congress sought to reassert its 
authority to decide when the United States should become involved in a war or 
the armed forces utilized in circumstances that might lead to war. On Nov. 7, 
1973, it passed the War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148) over the veto of Presi- 
dent Nixon. The main purpose of the Resolution was to circumscribe the Presi- 
dent's authority to use armed forces abroad in hostilities or potential hostil- 
ities without a declaration of war or other congressional authorization, yet 
provide enough flexibility to permit him to respond to attack or other emergen- 
cies. 
After ten years, the War Powers Resolution remains controversial. Some 
Members of Congress believe the Resolution has served as a restraint on the 
use of armed forces by the President and has given Congress a vehicle for 
asserting its war powers, Others have proposed amendments to the Resolution 
because they believe it has not been effective in assuring a congressional 
voice in commiting U.S. troops to potential conflicts abroad, Still other 
Members of Congress, along with many executive branch officials, contend that 
the President needs more flexibility in the conduct of foreign policy and 
that the time limitation in the War Powers Resolution is unconstitutional and 
inpractical. A few have suggested it be repealed. The central issue remains 
whether the War Powers Resolution is an effective and appropriate instrument 
for assuring that the President and Congress share in decisions to send 
U.S. forces into conflict abroad. 
This paper examines the provisions of the War Powers Resolution and 
the experience with it in its first ten years. 
I. PROVISIONS OF THE W A R  POWERS RESOLUTION 
Title -
Section 1 establishes the title, "The War Powers Resolution." The law is 
frequently referred to as the "War Powers Act," the title of the measure passed 
by the Senate. Although the latter is not technically correct, it does serve 
to emphasize that the War Powers Resolution, embodied in a joint resolution 
which complies with constitutional requirements for lawmaking, is a law. 
Purpose and policz 
Section 2 states the Resolution's purpose and policy, with Section 2(a) 
citing as the primary purpose to "insure that the collective judgment of both 
the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States 
Arned Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement 
in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued 
use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations." 
Section 2(b) points to the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitu- 
tion as the basis for legislation on the war powers. It provides that "Under 
Article I, section 8, of the Constitution it is specifically provided that 
Congress shall have the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carry- 
ing into execution, not only its own powers but also all other powers vested 
by the Constitution in the Government of the United States...." 
Section 2(c )  states the policy that the powers of the President as 
Commander in Chief to introduce U.S. armed forces into situations of hostil- 
ities or imminent hostilities "are exercised only pursuant to - 
(1) a declaration of war, 
(2) specific statutory authorization, or 
( 3 )  a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, 
its territories or possessions, or its arned forces." 
Consultation and reporting requirements 
Section 3 requires the President to consult with Congress prior to 
introducing U.S. armed forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities. The 
consultation provision is discussed in more detail in Part IV of this report. 
Section 4 requires the President to report to Congress whenever he intro- 
duces U.S. amed forces abroad in certain situations. Of key importance is 
Section 4(a)(l), which requires the President to report the introduction of 
troops troops "into hostilities or situations where imminent involvement in 
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances," because it triggers 
the time limit in section 5(b). Part 111 of this report discusses further the 
reporting requirements. 
Congressional action 
Section 5(a) deals with congressional procedures for receipt of a 
report under section 4(a)(l). It provides that if a report is transmitted 
during a congressional adjournment, the Speaker of the House and the President 
pro tempore of the Senate, when they deem it advisable or if petitioned by at 
least 30 percent of the Members of their respective Houses, shall jointly 
request the President to convene Congress in order to consider the report and 
take appropriate action. 
Section S(b)  was intended to be the main teeth of the War Powers Resolu- 
tion. After a report "is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to 
section 4(a)(l), whichever is earlier," section 5(b) requires the President to 
terminate the use of U.S. Armed Forces after 60 days, unless Congress (1) has . 
declared war or authorized the action; (2) has extended the period by law; or 
(3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an amed attack on the United 
States. The 60 days can be extended for 30 days by the President if he certifies 
that "unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United States 
Armed Forces" requires their continued use in the course of bringing about 
their removal. 
Section 5(c) requires the President to remove the forces at any time if 
Congress so directs by concurrent resolution; the effectiveness of this subsec- 
tion is uncertain because of the Supreme Court's decision on the legislative 
veto. It is discussed in Part 11 of this report. 
Priority procedures 
Sections 6 establishes expedited procedures for congressional considera- 
tion of a joint resolution or bill introduced to authorize the use of armed 
forces under section 5 (b). They provide for: 
(a) A referral to the House Foreign Affairs or Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, the committee to report one measure not later than 24 calendar days 
before the expiration of the 60 day period, unless the relevant House determines 
otherwise by a vote. 
(b) The reported measure to become the pending business of the relevant 
House and be voted on within three calendar days, unless that House determines 
otherwise by vote. In the Senate the debate is to be equally divided between 
proponents and opponents. 
(c) A measure passed by one House to be referred to the relevant committee 
of the other House and reported out not later than 14 calendar days before the 
expiration of the 60 day period, the reported bill to become the pending 
business of that House and be voted on within 3 calendar days unless determined 
otherwise by a vote. 
(d) Conferees to file a report not later than four calendar days before 
the expiration of the 60 day period. If they cannot agree within 48 hours, the 
conferees are to report back in disagreement, and such report is to be acted 
on by both Houses not later than the expiration of the 60 day period. 
Section 7 establishes similar priority procedures for a concurrent resolu- 
tion to withdraw forces under section 5(c). In addition to the legislative veto 
decision of the Supreme Court, recent legislation has implications on this sub- 
section and is discussed in Part I1 below. 
Interpretive provisions 
Section 8 sets forth certain interpretations relating to the Resolution. 
Section 8(a) states that authority to introduce armed forces is not to 
be inferred from any provision of law or treaty unless it specifically author- 
izes the introduction of armed forces into hostilities or potential hostilities 
and states that it is "intended to constitute specific statutory authorization 
within the meaning of this joint resolution." This language was derived from a 
Senate measure and was intended to prevent a security treaty or military appro- 
priations legislation from being used as authorization for the introduction of 
troops. It was also aimed against using a broad resolution like the Tonkin 
Gulf Resolution (P.L. 88-408, approved Aug. 10, 1964; repealed in 1971) to 
justify hostilities abroad. This resolution had stated that the United States 
was prepared to take all necessary steps, including use of armed force, to 
assist certain nations, and it was cited by Presidents for several years as 
congressional authorization for the Vietnam war. 
Section 8(b) states that further specific statutory authorization is not 
required 
to permit members of United States Armed Forces 
to participate jointly with members of the armed 
forces of one or more foreign countries in the 
headquarters operations of high-level military 
commands which were established prior to the date 
of enactment of this joint resolution and pursuant 
to the United Nations Charter or any treaty 
ratified by the United States prior to such date. 
This section was added by the Senate to make clear that the resolution did not 
prevent U.S. forces from participatin~ in certain joint military exercises 
with allied or friendly organizations or countries. The conference report 
stated that the "high-level" militar~ commands meant the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, (NATO), the iTorth American Air Defense Command (NORAD) 
and the United Nations command ir Korea. 
Section 8(c) defines the introduction of armed forces to include the 
assignment of armed forces to accompany regular or irregular military forces 
of other countries when engaged, or potentially engaged, in hostilities. 
The conference report on the War Powers Resolution explained that this 
was language modified from a Senate provision requiring specific statutory 
authorization for assigning members of the Armed Forces for such purposes. 
The report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on its bill said: 
The purpose of this provision is to prevent secret, 
unauthorized military support activities and to prevent a 
repetition of many of the most controversial and 
regrettable actions in Indochina. The ever deepening 
ground combat involvement of the United States in South 
Vietnam began with the assignment of U.S. "advisersn to 
accompany South Vietnamese units on combat patrols; and 
in Laos, secretly and without congressional authorization, 
U.S. "advisersn were deeply engaged in the war in 
northern Laos. - 1/ 
Section 8(d) states that nothing in the Resolution is intended to 
alter the constitutional authority of either the Congress or the President. 
It also specifies that nothing is to be construed as granting any authority 
to introduce troops that would not exist in the absence of the Resolution. 
The House report said that this provision was to help insure the constitu- 
tionality of the Resolution by making it clear that nothing in it could be 
interpreted as changing the powers delegated by the Constitution. In addition, 
it was to emphasize that the Resolution did not grant the President any new 
authority or any freedom of action during the time limits that he did not 
already have. 
11 U.S. Congress. Senate Report 93-220, p. 24. - 
Section 9 is a separability clause, stating that if any provision or its 
application is found invalid, the remainder of the Resolution is not to be 
af fected. 
11. EFFECT OF SUPREME COURT DECISION AGAINST LEGISLATIVE VETO 
President Nixon in his veto message challenged the constitutionality of 
two parts of the War Powers Resolution. - 21 He contended that the legislative veto 
provision, permitting Congress to direct the withdrawal of troops by concurrent 
resolution, was unconstitutional. He also contended the provision requiring 
withdrawal of troops after 60-90 days unless Congress passed legislation 
authorizing such use was unconstitutional because it allowed Presidential 
powers to lapse without affirmative congressional action. 
On June 23, 1983, the Supreme Court supported the first of the Nixon 
arguments when in - INS v. Chadha, it ruled unconstitutional the legislative 
veto provision in section 244 (c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. - 3 /  
Although the case involved the use of a one-House legislative veto, the deci- 
sion cast doubt on the validity of any legislative veto device that was not 
presented to the President for signature. The Court held that to accomplish 
what the House attempted to do in the Chadha case "requires action in conformity 
with the express procedures of the Constitution's prescription for legislative 
action: passage by a majority of both Houses and presentment to the President." 
On July 6, 1983, the Court sumarily affirmed the decision of the D.C. Court 
of Appeals striking down a provision of the Federal Trade Commission Improve- 
ments Act of 1980 that provided for a disapproval by concurrent (two-House) 
resolution. 4/ - 
2/ Congressional Record, November 7, 1973, p. S20093. - 
3/ 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983). - 
4/ U.S. Senate v. Federal Trade Commission, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983). - - 
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Since  s e c t i o n  5 ( c )  provides  f o r  Congress t o  d i r e c t  a  withdrawal 
of t roops  by a  concur ren t  r e s o l u t i o n ,  which does no t  r e q u i r e  present-  
ment t o  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ,  i t  i s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  s u s p e c t  under t h e  
reasoning a p p l i e d  by t h e  Court. - 5 /  
Because t h e  War Power Reso lu t ion  c o n t a i n s  a  s e p a r a b i l i t y  c l a u s e  i n  
s e c t i o n  9 ,  most a n a l y s t s  t a k e  t h e  view t h a t  t h e  remainder of t h e  j o i n t  
r e s o l u t i o n  would no t  be a f f e c t e d .  On J u l y  20, 1983, Deputy Attorney Genera l  
Edward Schmults t o l d  t h e  House Foreign A f f a i r s  Committee t h a t  " t h e  Supreme 
Cour t ' s  d e c i s i o n  does no t  a f f e c t  any of t h e  p rocedura l  mechanisms conta ined i n  
t h e  War Powers Resolut ion o t h e r  than t h a t  procedure s p e c i f i e d  i n  s e c t i o n  5 ( c ) ,  
which purpor ted  t o  a u t h o r i z e  Congress e f f e c t i v e l y  t o  r e c a l l  our  t roops  from 
abroad by a  r e s o l u t i o n  no t  p resen ted  t o  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  f o r  h i s  approval  o r  
d isapproval ."  Deputy S e c r e t a r y  of S t a t e  Kenneth W. Dam s t a t e d  t h e  same day  
t h a t  whi le  t h e  concurrent  r e s o l u t i o n  p rov i s ion  was c l e a r l y  u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ,  
i n  h i s  view, t h e  i s s u e  of t h e  t ime limits s e t  on P r e s i d e n t i a l  use  of t r o o p s  
abroad d i d  no t  f a l l  wi th in  t h e  scope of t h e  Chadha dec i s ion .  
Congress has  taken a c t i o n  t o  f i l l  t h e  gap l e f t  by t h e  apparent  i n v a l i d -  
i t y  of t h e  concur ren t  r e s o l u t i o n  mechanism f o r  t h e  withdrawal of t roops .  On 
October 20, 1983, t h e  Senate passed an amendment t o  t h e  S t a t e  Department author-  
i z a t i o n  b i l l  (S. 1324) t o  amend t h e  War Powers Reso lu t ion  by s u b s t i t u t i n g  a  
j o i n t  r e s o l u t i o n  which r e q u i r e s  presentment t o  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  f o r  t h e  concur ren t  
r e s o l u t i o n  i n  s e c t i o n  5 ( c ) ,  and providing t h a t  i t  would be handled under t h e  
expedi ted  procedures  i n  s e c t i o n  7. The House and Senate  confe rees  agreed no t  
5 /  Celada,  Raymond. J. E f f e c t  of t h e  L e g i s l a t i v e  Veto Decision on t h e  
TWO-~%se Disapproval  Mechanism t o  Terminate U. S. Involvement i n  H o s t i l i t i e s  
Pursuant  t o  U n i l a t e r a l  P r e s i d e n t i a l  Action. C.R.S. Report ,  August 24, 1983. 
to amend the War Powers Resolution itself, but they did adopt a free standing 
provision relating to a joint resolution for the withdrawal of troops. 
The measure provided that any joint resolution or bill to require the 
removal of U.S. armed forces engaged in hostilities outside the United States 
without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization would be con- 
sidered in accordance with the procedures of section 601(b) of the International 
Security and Arms Export Control Act of 1979, except that it would be amendable. 
The measure was agreed to by both Houses. - 6/ The priority procedures embraced 
by this provision apply in the Senate only. Handling of such a joint resolu- 
tion by the House is apparently left to that Chamber's discretion. The impli- 
cations of this congressional action are not fully apparent at the moment. 
6 /  Public Law 98-164, approved Nov. 22, 1983. - 

111. REPORTING REQUIRXEENTS 
The reporting requirements in the War Powers Resolution deserve special 
attention because one of them, section 4(a)(l), triggers the time limitation 
of section 5(b). Section 4(a)(l) requires the reporting within 48 hours, in 
the absence of a declaration of war or congressional authorization, of the 
introduction of U.S. armed forces "into hostilities or into situations where 
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances." 
Apparently because of its connection with the time limit, Presidents have 
been reluctant to report under the War Powers Resolution, especially under 
section 4(a)(l). Section 4(a)(l) has been cited by a President in a report 
on only one occasion, the Mayaguez incident. 
A controversial issue has become the meaning of "hostilities" and 
"situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated 
by the circumstances." Some indication of the meaning of this phrase is 
given in the House report (A. Rept. 93-287) on its War Powers bill: 
The word hostilities was substituted for the phrase 
armed conflict during the subcommittee drafting process 
because it was considered to be somewhat broader in 
scope. In addition to a situation in which fighting 
actially has begun, hostilities also encompasses a 
state of confrontation in which no shots have been 
fired but where there is a clear and present danger of 
armed conflict. "Imminent hostilities" denotes a 
situation in which there is a clear potential either 
for such a state of confrontation or for actual armed 
conflict. 
Section 4(a)(2) requires the reporting of the introduction of troops "into 
the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for com- 
bat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, 
or training of such forces." According to the House report this was to cover 
the initial commitment of troops in situations 
in which there is no actual fighting but some risk, 
however small, of the forces being involved in 
hostilities. A report would be required any time 
combat military forces were sent to another nation 
to alter or preserve the existing political status 
quo or to make the U.S. presence felt. Thus, for 
example, the dispatch of Marines to Thailand in 
1962 and the quarantine of Cuba in the same year 
would have required Presidential reports. Reports 
would not be required for routine port supply calls, 
emergency aid measures, normal training exercises, 
and other noncombat military activities. - 71 
Section 4(a)(3) requires the reporting of the introduction of troops "in 
numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for 
combat already located in a foreign nation." The House report elaborated: 
While the word "substantially" designates a flexible 
criterion, it is possible to arrive at a common-sense 
understanding of the numbers involved. A lOOX increase 
in numbers of Marine guards at an embassy -- say from 
5 to 10 -- clearly would not be an occasion for a report. 
A thousand additional men sent to Europe under present 
circumstances does not significantly enlarge the total 
U.S. troop strength of about 300,000 already there. 
However, the dispatch of 1,000 men to Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba, which now has a complement of 4,000 would mean an 
increase of 25%, which is substantial. Under this circum- 
stance, President Kennedy would have been required to 
report to Congress in 1962 when he raised the number of 
U.S. military advisers in Vietnam from 700 to 16,000. - 81 
Section 4(b) requires the President to furnish such other information 
as Congress may request to fulfill its responsibilities relating to commit- 
ting the nation to war. 
Section 4(c) requires the President to report to Congress periodically, 
and at least every six months, whenever U.S. forces are introduced into hostil- 
ities or any other situation in section 4(a). 
71 U.S. Congress. H. Rept. 93-287, p.7. - 
81 Ibid,, 93-257, p. 8. - 
The objectives of these provisions, the conference report stated, 
was to "ensure that the Congress by right and as a matter of law will be 
provided with all the information it requires to carry out its constitutional 
responsibilities with respect to committing the Nation to war and to the 
use of United States Armed Forces abroad." - 91 
Instances Formally Reported Under the War Powers Resolution 
Presidents have submitted reports under the War Powers Resolution on ten 
different occasions in the first decade of its existence. These included 
three instances related to evacuations at the end of the Vietnam war and the 
Mayaguez incident in 1975, the Iranian hostage rescue attempt in 1980, the 
Sinai multinational force and two occasions regarding Lebanon in 1982, and 
assistance to Chad and the action in Grenada in 1983. Brief descriptions of 
these incidents follow together with the provision of the War Powers Resolution 
and the constitutional or other legislative authority for the action cited in 
the report. 
(1) Danang. On April 4, 1975, President Ford reported the use of naval 
vessels, helicopters, and marines to transport refugees from Danang and other 
seaports to safer areas in Vietnam. His report mentioned section 4(a)(2) of 
the War Powers Resolution and said the action was pursuant to the President's 
constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive in the 
conduct of foreign relations, and pursuant to authorizations under the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 for humanitarian assistance to refugees suffering from 
the hostilities in South Vietnam. 
(2) Cambodia. On April 12, 1975, President Ford reported the use of 
ground combat Marines, helicopters, and supporting tactical air elements to 
assist with the evacuation of U.S. nationals from Cambodia. The 
report took note of both section 4 and section 4(a)(2) and cited as authority 
for the action the President's constitutional executive power and authority 
as Commander in Chief. 
(3) Vietnam. On April 30, 1975, President Ford reported the use of 
helicopters, Marines, and fighter aircraft to aid in the evacuation of U.S. 
citizens and others from South Vietnam. The report took note of section 4 and 
cited as authority for the action the President's constitutional executive 
power and his authority as Commander in Chief. 
(4) Mayaguez. On May 15, 1975, President Ford reported that he had 
ordered U.S. military forces to rescue the crew of and retake the ship Mayaguez 
that had been seized by Cambodian naval patrol boats on May 12, that the ship 
had been retaken, and that the withdrawal of the forces had been undertaken. 
The report took note of section 4(a)(l) of the War Powers Resolution and cited 
as authority the President's executive power and authority as Commander in 
Chief. 
( 5 )  - Iran. On April 26, 1980, President Carter reported the use of 
six aircraft and eight helicopters in an unsuccessful attempt of April 24 to 
rescue the American hostages in Iran. Stating the report was submitted 
"consistent with the reporting provision" of the War Powers Resolution, he 
cited as authority the President's powers as Chief Executive and Commander in 
Chief. 
(6) Sinai. On March 19, 1982, President Reagan reported the deployment . 
of military personnel and equipment to the Multinational Force and Observers 
(SO) in the Sinai to assist in carrying out the August 1981 treaty of peace 
between Egypt and Israel. The force was to patrol a buffer zone in the eastern 
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Sinai after Israel withdrew its forces. The President said the report was 
provided "consistent with section 4(a)(2) of the War Powers Resolution." 
President Reagan cited as authority for the deployment Public Law 97-132, the 
Multinational Force and Observers Participation Resolution, approved December 
29, 1981, and his "constitutional authority with respect to the conduct of 
foreign relations and as Commander in Chief...." 
(7) Lebanon. On August 21, 1982, President Reagan reported the dispatch 
of 800 Marines to serve in the multinational force to assist in the withdrawal 
of members of the Palestine Liberation force from Lebanon. The report did not 
cite any specific provision of the War Powers Resolution. As authority for 
the action, the President cited his "constitutional authority with respect to 
the conduct of foreign relations and as Commander in Chief." 
(8) Lebanon. On September 29, 1982, President Reagan reported tfie deploy- 
ment of 1,200 Marines to serve in a temporary multinational force to facilitate 
the restoration of Lebanese government sovereignty. He said the report was 
being submitted consistent with the War Powers Resolution, but did not mention 
a specific section of the Resolution. He cited as authority "the President's 
constitutional authority with respect to the conduct of foreign relations and 
as Commander in Chief of the United States armed forces." 
The President sent a second report citing section 4 on the use of this 
force on August 30, 1983, after the Marines were fired upon and two were killed. 
(For further information, including related legislative action, see section 
below on congressional invoking of the War Powers Resolution.) 
(9) - Chad. On August 8, 1983, President Reagan reported the deployment 
of two AWACS electronic surveillance planes and eight F-15 fighter planes and 
ground logistical support forces to Sudan to assist Chad and other friendly 
governments helping Chad against Libyan and rebel forces. He said the report 
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was being submitted consistent with Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution and 
that the deployment was taken under his constitutional authority with respect 
to foreign relations and as Commander in Chief. On August 23, 1983, State 
Department spokesman Alan D. Ronberg announced that the planes were being 
withdrawn. 
(10) Grenada. On October 25, 1983, President Reagan reported that U.S. 
Army and Marine personnel had begun landing in Grenada to join collective 
security forces of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States in assisting 
in the restoration of law and order in Grenada and to facilitate the protection 
and evacuation of U.S. citizens. He submitted the report "consistent with the 
War Powers Resolution" and cited as authority his "constitutional authority 
with respect to the conduct of foreign relations and as Commander-in-Chief of 
the United States Armed Forces." 
Many in Congress contended that the President's report should have cited 
section 4(a)(l) of the War Powers Resolution, which would have triggered the 
60-90 day time limitation. On November 1, 1983, the House supported this 
interpretation when it adopted, by a vote of 403-23, H. J. Res. 402 declaring 
that the requirements of section 4(a)(l) had become operative on October 25. 
The Senate adopted a similar measure on October 28 by a vote of 64 to 20, but 
on November 17 the provision was deleted in the conference report on the debt 
limit bill to which it was attached. - 10/ On November 17, White House spokesman 
Larry Speakes said the Administration had indicated that there was no need for 
action as the combat troops would be out within the 60-90 day time period. 
Speaker Thomas O'Neill took the position that, whether or not Congress passed 
specific legislation, the War Powers Resolution had become operative on 
October 25. 
101 U.S. Congress. H. Rept. 98-566 on H. J. Res. 308; Senate amendment 
numbered 3. Congressional Record November 17, 1983, p. H10189. 
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By December 15, 1983, all U.S. combat troops had been removed from Grenada 
but 300 support forces remained. 
Instances Not Formally Reported to the Congress 
In some instances where armed forces have been used abroad, questions 
were raised in Congress because reports were not filed. 
Brief uses of military forces 
In four unreported cases, the military action was brief and congressional 
concern about the lack of a report under the War Powers Resolution was short- 
lived. 
-- Cyprus. On July 22 and 23, 1974, helicopters from five U.S. naval 
vessels evacuated approximately 500 Americans and foreign nationals from hostil- 
ities in Cyprus. 
-- Lebanon. On June 20, 1976, a U.S. Navy landing craft evacuated 263 
Americans and Europeans from Lebanon during fighting between Lebanese factions. 
An overland convoy evacuation to Damascus had been blocked by hostilities. 
-- Korea. In August 1976, two American military personnel who had entered 
the demilitarized zone in Korea to cut down a tree were killed by North Korean 
soldiers, and additional forces were sent to Korea during the surrounding 
period of tension. Representative Elizabeth Holtzman raised the question of 
compliance with the War Powers Resolution at hearings on September 1, 1976. The 
Administration took the position that it would be an undesirable precedent to 
construe the resolution as requiring a report when a "relative handful" of 
people had been added to the 41,000 troops already in Korea. 111 The augmenting -
forces included a squadron of 20 F-111s and a squadron of 18 F-4s. 
11/ U.S. Congress. House Committee on International Relations. 
~eathrof American military personnel in the Korean demilitarized zone. 
Sept. 1, 1976. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. p. 16. 
-- Zaire. From May 19 through June 1978, the United States utilized 
transport aircraft to provide logistical support for Belgian and French rescue 
operations in Zaire. The President did not submit a report on the operation 
under the War Powers Resolution. In August, the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
held hearings on the question of compliance with the War Powers Resolution in 
that instance. Chairman Clement Zablocki agreed with the Department of State 
that the Zaire airlift operation did not fall within the scope of action requir- 
ing a report. Representative Paul Findley, on the other hand, contended that 
the operation had placed American servicemen in a situation of "imminent hostil- 
ities," and introduced a resolution ( H .  Con. Res. 689) requesting the President 
to submit such a report. - 121 No further action was taken on the resolution. 
El Salvador: When are military advisers in imminent hostilities? 
Considerable controversy over whether the President was required to report 
under the War Powers Resolution has surrounded the sending of U.S. military 
advisers to El Salvador. 
At the end of February 1981, the Department of State announced the dis- 
patch of 20 additional military advisers to El Salvador to aid its government 
against guerilla warfare. There were already 19 military advisers in El Salva- 
dor sent by the Carter Administration. The Reagan Administration said the 
insurgents were organized and armed by Soviet bloc countries, particularly 
Cuba. By March 14 the Administration had authorized a total of 54 advisers, 
including experts in intelligence, combat training, helicopter maintenance, 
communications, and counterinsurgency. 
121 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 
~on~rzsional oversight of War Powers compliance: Zaire Airlift. 
Hearing, August 10, 1978. p. 2. 
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The President did not report the situation under any provision of the War 
Powers Resolution. A State Department memorandum said a report was not required 
because the U.S. personnel were not being introduced into hostilities or situa- 
tions of imminent hostilities. 
A justification for not reporting under section 4(a)(2) was that the 
military personnel being introduced were not equipped for combat. E/ They 
would, it was maintained, carry only personal sidearms which they were author- 
ized to use only in their own defense or the defense of other Americans. 
The State Department held that section 8(c) of the War Powers Resolution 
was not intended to require a report when U.S. military personnel might be 
involved in training foreign military personnel if there were no imminent 
involvement of U.S. personnel in hostilities. In the case of El Salvador, the 
memorandum said, U.S. military personnel "will not act as combat advisors, and 
will not accompany Salvadoran forces in combat, on operational patrols, or in 
any other situation where combat is likely." 
The situation immediately raised questions in Congress about the applica- 
bility of the War Powers Resolution and legislation was introduced to require 
the President to report under the War Powers Resolution. 
On May 1, 1981, eleven Members of Congress challenged (Crockett v. Reagan, 
558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982)) the President's action on grounds that he had 
violated Constitution and the War Powers Resolution by sending the advisers to 
El Salvador. Eventually there were 29 co-plaintiffs, but by June 18, 1981, an 
equal number of Members (13 Senators and 16 Representatives) filed a motion to 
intervene in the suit, contending that a number of legislative measures were 
then pending before Congress and that Congress had had ample opportunity to vote 
to end military assistance to El Salvador if it had wished. 
13/ Congressional Record, Mar. 5, 1981: E901. -
On October 4, 1982, U.S. District Court Judge Joyce Hens Green dismissed 
the suit, She ruled that Congress, not the court, must resolve the question 
of whether the U.S. forces in El Salvador are involved in a hostile or poten- 
tially hostile situation. While there might be situations in which a court 
could conclude that U.S. forces were involved in hostilities, she ruled, the 
"subtleties of fact-finding in this situation should be left to the political 
branches." She noted that Congress had taken no action to show it believes the 
President's decision is subject to the War Powers Resolution. Representative 
Crockett filed an appeal on Harch 9, 1983. 
As the involvement continued, casualties occurred among the U.S. military 
advisers, and reports circulated that the number of military advisers might be 
increased, various legislative proposals relating to the War Powers Resolution 
and El Salvador were introduced. One approach taken by these proposals was to 
amend the War Powers Resolution to require a specific authorization prior to 
the introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities or combat in El Salvador. - 14/ 
The other approach was to declare that the commitment of U.S. Amed Forces in 
El Salvador necessitated compliance with section 4(a) of the War Powers Resolu- 
tion, requiring the President to submit a report. - 151 
Neither approach was adopted in legislation, however, and on July 26, 1983, 
the House rejected an amendment to the Defense Authorization bill (H.R. 2969) that 
14/ On March 8, 1982, Senator Robert Byrd introduced the War Powers Resolu- 
tion Amendments of 1982 (S. 2179) specifically providing that U.S. armed forces 
shall not be introduced into El Salvador for combat unless (1) the Congress has 
declared war or specifically authorized such use; or (2) such introduction was 
necessary to meet a clear and present danger of attack on the United States or 
to provide immediate evacuation of U.S. citizens. Similar bills were introduced 
in the House, e.g. H.R. 1619 and H.R. 1777 in the 98th Congress. 
15/ H.Con. Res. 87, 97th Congress. -
sought to limit the number of active duty military advisers in El Salvador to 
55, unless the President reported them under section 4(a)(l) of the War Powers 
Resolution. - 16/ 
Central America: When are military exercises more than training? 
The need to report military exercises under the War Powers Resolution 
became a controversial matter in 1983 in regard to military exercises in 
Central America and the Caribbean, 
On July 27, 1983, President Reagan explained the planning of two "joint 
training exercises" in Central America and the Caribbean. One would be a 
series of ground exercises in Honduras with the combined forces of Honduras 
and the United States involving 3,000 to 4,000 U.S. Army and Marine combat 
troops; the second would be a series of ocean exercises with the U.S. fleet. 
The first contingent of U.S. troops for the manuevers called "Big Pine 11" 
landed in Honduras on August 8. The number expected to be involved was 
raised to between 5,000 and 6,000 ground troops plus 19 warships and 140 
fighter planes. 
The President did not submit a report under the War Powers Resolution. 
He characterized the maneuvers as routine and said the United States had been 
regularly conducting joint exercises with Latin American countries since 1965. 
Some Members of Congress, on the other hand, contended that the exercises in- 
creased the U.S. military involvement in Central America and called for report- 
ing them under the War Powers Resolution. 
Other Members of Congress sought other vehicles for maintaining congres- 
sional control. Senator Hart introduced a bill entitled the "War Powers in 
Central America Act" which would permit an increase in military involvement in 
16/ Congressional Record, July 26, 1983, p. H5623, -
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Central America only after a joint resolution of Congress or a written request 
by the President stating that an increase was necessary to protect the lives of 
American citizens or respond to the danger of an attack on the United States. - 17/ 
The major congressional efforts centered on placing restrictions on covert 
military aid to anti-Communist factions in Nicaragua rather than on seeking 
compliance with the War Powers Resolution. 
CRS- 2 5 
CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS 
One of the ways that the War Powers Resolution sought to assure a 
congressional voice in decisions that might involve the United States in war 
was by mandating consultation. Section 3 of the War Powers Resolution 
requires the President "in every possible instance" to consult with Congress 
before introducing U.S. Armed Forces into situations of hostilities and 
imminent hostilities, and to continue consultations as long as the armed 
forces remain in such situations. Some observers contend that promoting 
such consultation is a major purpose of the War Powers Resolution. 
Has the executive branch complied with the consultation requirements? 
Has consultation been adequate to permit congressional views to be factored 
into decisions? 
In almost every instance involving the use of armed forces since the 
passage of the Resolution, some in Congress have complained about lack 
of consultation. In only one instance, the U.S. participation in the interna- 
tional peacekeeping force in the Sinai that was authorized by Congress, has 
consultation appeared clearly adequate to permit a significant congressional 
voice in advance of the use of the forces. Other observers contend that the 
executive branch has complied with the consultation requirements. A number of - 
ambiguities, loopholes, and problems -- in addition to the different institu- 
tional interests of Congress and the President -- account for the controversy. 
One problem is the occasion when consultation is required. A frequently 
expressed congressional view is that consultation should occur in any situation 
mentioned in the War Powers Resolution. Yet the War Powers Resolution estab- 
lished different criteria for consultation than for reporting. Consultation 
is required only before introducing armed forces into "hostilities or into 
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by 
the circumstances." Reporting is required in these circumstances plus the 
additional ones listed in section 4(a)(2) and 4(a)(3) dealing with the intro- 
duction or increase of troops equipped for combat. Thus, consultation is not 
necessarily required even though a report may be. Moreover, consultation is 
required only under circumstances that trigger the time limitation, and 
Presidents have proved reluctant to acknowledge and report the existence of 
these circumstances. 
A second problem is the meaning of the term consultation. Differences of 
opinion exist on the timing, nature, and extent of consultation. The executive 
branch may count informational briefings as consultations, whereas Members of 
Congress may expect consultation to mean that they have an opportunity to ex- 
press an opinion before the decision is made. The House report on the measure 
said, "...consultation in this provision means that a decision is pending on a 
problem and that Members of Congress are being asked by the President for their 
advice and opinions and, in appropriate circumstances, their approval of action 
contemplated." - 18/ 
Consultation does not mean congressional authorization, which can be 
given only by the entire Congress through the legislative process. - 19/ 
On the other hand, the seeking of authorization from Congress is perhaps the 
highest form of consultation, and the process of obtaining authorization 
presumably assures a great deal of consultation. 
18/ U.S. Congress. H. Rept. 93-287. -
19/ Javits, Jacob, K. Prepared statement. In U.S. Congress. House. 
~ommiEee on International Relations. War Powers : A Test of Compliance 
Relative to the Danang Sealift, the Evacuation of Phnom Penh, the Evacuation 
of Saigon, and the Valaquez Incident. Hearings, May 7 and June 4, 1975, 
pa 68. 
A third problem involves what constitutes congressional representation 
for consultation purposes. It has been generally recognized that, since there 
are 535 Members of Congress, it would be extremely difficult to consult them 
all, except by seeking a formal authorization. The House version specifically 
called for consultation between the President and the leadership and appropriate 
committees. This was changed to less specific wording in conference, however, 
in order to provide some flexibility. 
The Record of Consultation Under the War Powers Resolution 
In the first four cases reported under the War Powers Resolution, the 
executive branch held that it had met the consultation requirement because 
the President had directed that Congress be notified prior to the actual com- 
mencement of the introduction of armed forces. 
Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser to the Department of State, testified that 
in the case of the Danang sealift, the President "advised the members of the 
Senate and House leadership that a severe emergency existed in the coastal 
communities of South Vietnam and that he was directing American naval trans- 
ports and contract vessels to assist in the evacuation of refugees from coastal 
seaports." - 201 
In the case of the evacuations from Cambodia and Saigon, Mr. Leigh said, 
on April 3, 1975, the same day that the President authorized the Ambassador to 
evacuate the American staff, he directed that the leaders of the Senate and 
House be advised of the general plan of evacuation. On April 28, the President 
201 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 
War ~ z e r s :  A test of compliance relative to the Danang sealift, the 
evacuation of Phnom Penh, the evacuation of Saigon, and the Mayaguez 
incident. Hearings, May 7 and June 4, 1975. Washington, U.S. Govt. 
Printing Off., 1975. p. 3. 
d i r e c t e d  t h a t  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  l e a d e r s  be n o t i f i e d  t h a t  t h e  f i n a l  phase  of t h e  
e v a c u a t i o n  of Saigon would be c a r r i e d  o u t  by m i l i t a r y  f o r c e s  w i t h i n  t h e  next  
few hours .  - 21/ 
I n  t h e  Mayaguez c a s e ,  M r .  Leigh s a i d ,  10 Members from t h e  House and 11 
S e n a t o r s  were "con tac t ed  r ega rd ing  t h e  m i l i t a r y  measures d i r e c t e d  by t h e  P r e s i -  
den t "  t o  prevent  t h e  crew of t h e  Mayaguez from be ing  t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  t h e  Cambo- 
d i a n  mainland and on t h r e e  a d d i t i o n a l  o c c a s i o n s  a s  t h e  a c t i o n  progressed .  - 22/
I n 3 t h e  c a s e  of t h e  I r a n i a n  hos t age  r e s c u e  a t t e m p t ,  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  branch 
dec ided  t h a t  c o n s u l t a t i o n  could  endanger  t h e  s u c c e s s  of t h e  miss ion .  S ince  
t h e  War Powers Reso lu t ion  r e q u i r e s  c o n s u l t a t i o n  " i n  eve ry  p o s s i b l e  i n s t a n c e "  
t h e r e  was disagreement  among Members of Congress as t o  whether  t h e  l a c k  of 
c o n s u l t a t i o n  was a  v i o l a t i o n  of t h e  War Powers Resolu t ion .  
A f t e r  t h e  a b o r t i v e  a t t empt  t o  r e s c u e  t h e  hos t ages  i n  I r a n ,  t h e  Sena te  Fo re ign  
R e l a t i o n s  Committee h e l d  h e a r i n g s  on t h e  i n c i d e n t .  I n  h e a r i n g s  publ i shed  
a f t e r  t h e  h o s t a g e s  were r e l e a s e d ,  Chairman Frank Church s t r e s s e d  t h r e e  p o i n t s  
as g u i d e l i n e s  f o r  t h e  f u t u r e .  F i r s t ,  c o n s u l t a t i o n  r e q u i r e d  g i v i n g  Congress a n  
o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t h e  d e c i s i o n  making p roces s ,  no t  j u s t  in forming  
Congress t h a t  an  o p e r a t i o n  was underway. Second, t h e  judgment could  not  be  
made u n i l a t e r a l l y  but  should  be made by t h e  P r e s i d e n t  and Congress. Th i rd ,  
t h e  I r a n i a n  h e a r i n g s  showed l a c k  of agreement on t h e  q u e s t i o n  of whom i n  
Congress should  be c o n s u l t e d ,  The l e a d e r s h i p  of t h e  House and Senate?  
211 I b i d . ,  p. 6. -
22/ Ib id . ,  p. 78. -
The l e a d e r s h i p  p lus  t h e  l e a d e r s  of t h e  Senate  Fore ign R e l a t i o n s  Committee and 
t h e  House Foreign A f f a i r s  Committee? The e n t i r e  membership of those  committees? 
Members of o t h e r  committees? Senator  Church concluded: "These a r e  m a t t e r s  
t h a t  Congress i t s e l f  must decide. " 231 
I n  t h e  f i r s t  d i spa tch  of Marines t o  Lebanon i n  1982, P r e s i d e n t  Reagan 
began d i s c u s s i o n s  wi th  congress ional  l e a d e r s  on J u l y  6 a f t e r  t h e  p lan  had been 
p u b l i c l y  announced, and a f t e r  l e a k s  i n  t h e  I s r a e l i  p r e s s  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  h e  had 
approved t h e  plan on J u l y  2. 241 On the  second Mul t ina t iona l  Force i n  Lebanon 
t h e r e  was a  considerable  amount of n e g o t i a t i o n  between t h e  execut ive  branch 
and Congress t h a t  e v e n t u a l l y  l e d  to  l e g i s l a t i o n  au thor iz ing  U.S. p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
f o r  e igh teen  months, but most of i t  occurred a f t e r  t h e  dec i s ion  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  
had been made and t h e  Marines were i n  Lebanon. 251 
I n  t h e  1983 a c t i o n  i n  Grenada, P res iden t  Reagan m e t  w i t h  s e v e r a l  con- 
g r e s s i o n a l  l e a d e r s  a t  8  p.m. on October 24. - 261 This  was a f t e r  the  d i r e c t i v e  
o rder ing  t h e  landing had been signed a t  6  p.m., but before t h e  a c t u a l  invas ion  
t h a t  began a t  5:30 a.m., October 25. 
231 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Rela t ions .  The 
s i  t u a z o n  i n  I ran .  Hearing, 96th  Congress, 2d sess ion.  May 8,  1980. 
Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  Off.,  1980. p. iii. 
241 Oberdorf e r ,  Don and John M. Goshko. Peace-keeping Force. Washington 
~ o s t , ? u l ~  7 ,  1982, p. 1. 
251 Gwetzman, Bernard. U.S. To Send Back Marines to  Bierut .  New York 
~ i m e s 7 s e ~ t .  21, 1982, p. 1. 
261 U.S. Declares Goal i n  t o  P r o t e c t  Americans and Restore  Order. 
washington Post ,  Oct. 26, 1983. p. A7. 
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V. LEBANON: CONGRESS INVOKES THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION 
The War Powers Resolution faced perhaps its greatest test to date when 
Marines sent to participate in a Multinational Force in Lebanon in 1982 became 
the targets of hostile fire in August 1983. During this period President 
Reagan filed 3 reports under the War Powers Resolution, but he did not report 
under section 4(a)(l) that the forces were being introduced into hostilities 
or imminent hostilities, thus triggering the 60-90 day time limit. 
On September 29, 1983, Congress passed the Multinational Force in Lebanon 
Resolution determining that the requirements of section 4(a)(l) of the War 
Powers Resolution became operative on August 29, 1983. - 27/ In the same resolution, 
Congress authorized the continued participation of the Marines in the Multina- 
tional Force for 18 months. The resolution was a compromise between Congress 
and the President. Congress obtained the President's signature on legislation 
invoking and thus implicitly recognizing the application of the War Powers 
Resolution for the first time, but the price for this concession was a con- 
gressional authorization for the U.S. troops to remain in Lebanon for 18 months. 
The events leading to the compromise began on July 6, 1982, when President 
Reagan announced he had agreed to contribute a small contingent of U.S. troops 
to a multinational force for temporary peacekeeping in Lebanon. That same day 
the late Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Clement Zablocki 
wrote President Reagan expressing concern that if such a force were sent, the 
United States would be introducing forces into imminent hostilities and a 
report under section 4(a)(l) would be required. However, when the forces 
2 7 1  P.L. 98-119, approved Oct. 12, 1983. -
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began to land on August 25, President Reagan did not cite section 4(a)(l) and 
said the agreement with Lebanon ruled out any combat responsibilities. After 
overseeing the departure of the Palestine Liberation Organization force, the 
Marines in the first Multinational Force left Lebanon on September 10, 1982. 
The second dispatch of Marines to Lebanon began on September 20, 1982. 
President Reagan announced that the United States, France, and Italy had 
agreed to form a new multinational force to return to Lebanon for a limited 
period of tine to help maintain order until the lawful authorities in Lebanon 
could discharge those duties. The action followed three events that took 
place after the withdrawal of the first group of Marines: the assassination 
of President-elect Bashir Gemayel, the entry of Israeli forces into West Beirut, 
and the massacre of Palestinian civilians by Lebanese Christian militiamen. 
On September 29, 1982, President Reagan submitted a report that 1,200 
Marines had begun to arrive in Beirut, but again he did not cite section 4(a)(l), 
saying the American force would not engage in combat. As a result of incidents 
in which Marines were killed or wounded, there was again controversy in Congress 
on whether the President's report should have been filed under section 4(a)(l), 
but Congress did not pass any legislation on the subject. On November 28, 
1982, the end of the sixty day period following their introduction, the Marines 
were still in Lebanon. 
Nevertheless, Congress passed the Lebanon Emergency Assistance Act of 
1983 requiring 
number or role 
that stated: 
statutory authorization for any substantial expansion in the 
in Lebanon of U.S. Armed Forces. It also included Section 4(b) 
Nothing in this section is intended to modify, limit, 
or suspend any of the standards and procedures prescribed 
by the War Powers Resolution of 1983. - 28/ 
28/ P.L. 98-43, approved June 27, 1983. -
President Reagan reported on the Lebanon situation for the third time 
on August 30, but still not citing section 4(a)(l), after fighting broke out 
between various factions in Lebanon and the Marines were fired upon and two 
Marines were killed. The level of fighting heightened. On September 1, Presi- 
dent Reagan ordered a naval task force including 2,000 Marines, fighter planes, 
and artillery to the shores of Lebanon. On September 12, President Reagan 
authorized the marines in Beirut to call in air strikes against forces shelling 
their position. On September 13, the Administration announced that defense of 
the Marines could include the use of U.S. airpower and artillery to assist 
other members of the multinational force or the Lebanese armed forces in certain 
circumstances. 
As the Marine casualties increased and the action enlarged, there were 
more calls in Congress for invocation of the'War Powers Resolution. Several 
Kembers of Congress said the situation had changed since the President's first 
report and introduced legislation that took various approaches. Senator Mathias 
introduced S.J. Res. 159 effectively stating that the time limit specified in 
the War Powers Resolution had begun on August 31, 1983, and authorizing the 
forces to remain in Lebanon for a period of 120 days after the expiration of 
the 60-day period. Representative Downey introduced H.J.Res. 348 directing 
the President to report under section 4(a)(l) of the War Powers Resolution. 
Senator Robert Byrd introduced S.J. Res. 163 finding that section 4(a)(l) of 
the war powers resolution applies to the present circumstances in Lebanon. 
The House Appropriations Committee approved an amendment to the continuing 
resolution for fiscal year 1984, sponsored by Rep. Clarence Long, providing 
that after 60 days funds could not be "obligated or expended for peacekeeping 
activities in Lebanon by United States Armed Forces" unless the President had 
submitted a report under section 4(a)(l) of the War Powers Resolution. 
On September 20, congressional leaders and President Reagan agreed on a 
compromise resolution invoking section 4(a)(l) and authorizing the Marines to 
remain for 18 months. 
The resolution became the first legislation to be handled under the expe- 
dited procedures of the War Powers Resolution. On September 27, the House 
Rules Committee reported the resolution providing for consideration under a 
rule permitting two hours of general debate with only three specified amendments 
in order. On September 28, the House passed H.J. Res. 364 by a vote of 270 to 
161. The House rejected the amendment relating to a cutoff of funds unless 
the President invoked section 4(a)(l) of the War Powers Resolution. 
After three days of debate, on September 29, the Senate passed S.J. Res. 159 
by a vote of 54 to 46. The Senate rejected an amendment by Senator Byrd to 
require the President to submit to Congress the report required under section 
4(a)(l) of the War Powers Resolution. Among other amendments rejected were 
ones designed to shorten the authorized period of participation and to clarify 
the purpose of the mission. 
The House accepted the Senate bill by a vote of 253 to 156. As passed, 
the resolution contained four occurrences that would terminate the authori- 
zation before eighteen months: (1) the withdrawal of all foreign forces from 
Lebanon, unless the President certified continued U.S. participation was required 
to accomplish the purposes specified in the September 25, 1982, exchange of 
letters providing for the establishment of the Multinational Force In Lebanon; 
(2) the assumption by the United Nations or the Government of Lebanon of the 
responsibilities of the Multinational Force; (3) the implementation of other 
effective security arrangements; or (4) the withdrawal of all other countries 
from participation in the Multinational Force. 
When he signed the resolution on October 13, 1983, President Reagan 
stated that Congress had made a number of findings, determinations, and 
assertions in the bill, which, while it was appropriate for Congress to 
make, he did not necessarily agree with. He used as an example the 
congressional determination that the requirements of section 4(a)(l) became 
operative on August 29, 1983, and said, "I would note that the iaitiation of 
isolated or infrequent acts of violence against United States armed forces 
does not necessarily constitute actual or imminent involvement in hostilities, 
even if casualties to those forces result. I think it reasonable to recognize 
the inherent risk and imprudence of setting any precise formula for making 
such determinations." - 291 In addition, he said: 
Nor should my signing be viewed as any acknowledgment that 
the President's constitutional authority can be impermissibly 
infringed by statute, that congressional authorization would be 
required if and when the period specified in section 5(b) of the 
War Powers Resolution might be deemed to have been triggered and 
the period had expired or that section 6 of the Multinational 
Force in Lebanon Resolution may be interpreted to revise the 
President's constitutional authority to deploy United States 
armed forces. - 301 
291 New York Times, October 13, 1983. -
301 Ibid. Section 6 of the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution 
authoxzes participation for eighteen months and provides for earlier termin- 
ation in certain circumstances. 

VI PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 
The first decade of experience with the War Powers Resolution has been 
mixed. Controversy continues over its effectiveness and appropriateness as a 
vehicle for maintaining a congressional role in the use of armed forces in 
conflict . 
One view is that War Powers Resolution has been effective in moderating 
Presidents' responses to crisis situations because of their awareness that 
certain actions might invoke various provisions in the War Powers Resolution. 
Presidents have acknowledged the resolution by reporting ten separate uses of 
armed forces abroad. Congress, in passing the Multinational Force in Lebanon 
Resolution, demonstrated that it can utilize the War Powers Resolution to 
assert itself in the use of forces abroad. Moreover, even though legislation 
invoking the resolution was not finally adopted, the threat appeared helpful 
in getting U.S. forces out of Grenada. 
A contrary view is that the War Powers Resolution is not accomplishing 
its objectives. In this view, Presidents have continued to introduce U.S. 
armed forces into hostilities without consulting Congress and without 
congressional authorization, and this has been obscured by emphasis on the 
reporting requirements and time limitation provisions. They have cited 
section 4(a)(l) on only one occasion -- Mayaguez -- and never in a situation 
that has been likely to continue beyond 60 or 90 days. With the provision 
permitting Congress to withdraw troops by concurrent resolution under a cloud 
because of the Chadha decision, such a decision would now require legislation 
that would have to be signed by the President or passed over his veto. 
Some supporters of the resolution have proposed amendments to strengthen 
the War Powers Resolution, although others believe that opening the resolution 
to amendments might result in its weakening or repeal. 
I n  1977, Senator  Eagle ton proposed t h a t  t h e  Wsr Powers Reso lu t ion  r e t u r n  
t o  t h e  o r i g i n a l  language of t h e  v e r s i o n  passed by t h e  Sena te ,  r e q u i r i n g  p r i o r  
congress iona l  a u t h o r i z a t i o n  f o r  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of f o r c e s  i n t o  c o n f l i c t  abroad 
excep t  t o  respond t o  an  armed a t t a c k  a g a i n s t  t h e  United S t a t e s  o r  i t s  f o r c e s  
o r  t o  p r o t e c t  U.S. c i t i z e n s  whi le  evacua t ing  them. Th i s  amendment would e l imin-  
a t e  t h e  concept t h a t  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  has  60 t o  90 days  i n  which he  can m i l i t a r i l y  
a c t  wi thout  a u t h o r i z a t i o n .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e  House o r i g i n a l l y  opposed 
t h i s  v e r s i o n  i n  t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  such language would provide  a b lanke t  au thor i -  
z a t i o n  t o  r e s c u e  American c i t i z e n s  abroad t h a t  might be abused,  y e t  t h a t  i t  
might not  provide  f l e x i b i l i t y  i n  o t h e r  c i rcumstances .  On September 29, 1983, 
a f t e r  t h e  passage of t h e  M u l t i n a t i o n a l  Force i n  Lebanon Reso lu t ion ,  Sena to r s  
Crans ton,  Eagle ton,  and S t e n n i s  in t roduced  such an  amendment again .  - 31/
Other proposed amendments have focused on improving c o n s u l t a t i o n  under 
t h e  r e s o l u t i o n .  A f t e r  t h e  Mayaguez crisis Senator  Thomas Eagle ton and Repre- 
s e n t a t i v e  John F. S e i b e r l i n g  in t roduced  amendments t h a t  c a l l e d  f o r  t h e  P r e s i -  
den t  t o  seek  t h e  "advice  and counseln  of Congress be fo re  t a k i n g  an  a c t i o n  t h a t  
f i r m l y  committed t h e  United S t a t e s  t o  h o s t i l i t i e s .  The amendments s p e c i f i e d  
t h a t  c o n s u l t a t i o n  should  i n c l u d e  but not be l i m i t e d  t o  t h e  Sena te  and House 
l e a d e r s h i p  and t h e  r ank ing  and m i n o r i t y  members of t h e  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  and 
armed s e r v i c e s  c o m i t t e e s .  - 32/ 
Another proposal  would a t tempt  t o  improve c o n s u l t a t i o n  by broadening 
t h e  i n s t a n c e s  i n  which t h e  P r e s i d e n t  i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  c o n s u l t  t o  cover  a l l  
s i t u a t i o n s  i n  which a  P r e s i d e n t  is  r e q u i r e d  t o  r e p o r t ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  on ly  cfrcum- 
s t a n c e s  t h a t  invoke t h e  t i m e  l i m i t a t i o n ,  as i s  now t h e  case .  =/ 
31/ 9 8 t h  Cong., S. 1906. -
32/ 9 4 t h  Congress, B.R. 7594 and S. 1790. -
33/ S t reng then ing  Execu t ive -Leg i s l a t ive  Consu l t a t ion  on Fore ign Pol icy .  
~ o r e i z  A f f a i r s  Committee P r i n t ,  October 1983, p. 67.  
On the issue of appropriateness, Congress has demonstrated continued 
support for the War Powers Resolution on various occasions in addition to the 
votes on Lebanon and Grenada. When considering the establishment of the Rapid 
Deployment Force, the Senate adopted an amendment stating the sense of the 
Congress "that the provisions of the War Powers Resolution be strictly adhered 
to and that the congressional consultation process specified by such Resolution 
be utilized in a meaningful manner." - 341 On August 11, 1982, the Senate adopted 
an amendment by Senator Bumpers to the supplemental appropriations bill, stating 
that the Symms amendment it had adopted regarding Cuba did "not constitute the 
statutory authorization for introduction of United States Armed Forces contem- 
plated by the War Powers Resolution." 351 -
Some members, however, believe that the War Powers Resolution is an 
inappropriate instrument that restricts the President's effectiveness in foreign 
policy. On October 31, 1983, Senator Barry Goldwater introduced S. 2030 to 
repeal the War Powers Resolution. In his view, the basic premise of the War 
Powers Resolution was wrong because in it Congress attempted to assume the 
controlling power over the use and deployment of U.S. military forces and this 
was a responsibility of the President. 361 -
341 Section 102 of P.L. 96-533, approved Dec. 16, 1980. -
351 The Symms amendment reiterated the 1962 Cuban resolution and expressed 
determination to prevent by whatever means necessary the extension by Cuba of 
terrorism or aggression in the Western Hemisphere. P.L. 97-257, approved 
Sept. 10, 1982. 
361 Congressional Record, July 12, 1983, p. S9670. -
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